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IN IBE SUPREME COURT OF TI-IE STATE OF UTAH

: The State of Utah

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 20034

I

iDonald Hansen
Defendant-Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF TI-IE KIND OF CASE
The appellant has appealed from a conviction of Assault

i

I

Iwith a Deadly Weapon with the Intent to Commit Robbery upon

I

ju:i:y trial in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County.

I

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict of guilty

: tu the crime charged, the defendant appeals.
I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of his conviction as a matter
lof bw, or that failing, a new trial.

2
STATE~1ENT

OF FACTS

On October 23, 1966 at approximately 1:10 A.M., Appellant
i;l1tc1ed

a Salt Lake City tavern, Club 451, operated by one,

G2orl_';e Rukavina. As he entered the front door, he was seen

vy Mr. Rukavina to have had a pistol in his hand and was heard
to say "don't move." R-5. Mr. Rukavina dropped to the floor
and c::.·::nvled behind the bar to his office. In the meantime, a

cJicencler employed by Mr. Rukavina, Mr. Joe Palanco, grabbed
the appellant and wrestled him to the ground. R-5, 22. Mr.

! Palcnco took the pistol away from the appellant and gave it
~,lr.

to

Rukavina who in turn gave it to another employee, Mr.

E\'Jl'isto Martinez. R-6
During the scuffle, the appellant wrestled his way to the
entrance and out into the street where he was ultimately subdued by Mr. Palanco and Salt Lake Police Officer Christensen
1·1lio had seen what he thought to be a fight and had stopped to
in·:cst~gn.te.

R-45.

Later Mr. Rukavina found a clip containing seven live
rnunds

of ammunition on the floor in the area where the scuf-

fi mg had taken place. R -10. This clip proved to be of the
r'-r:c used in appellant's pistol.

The pistol itself contained no

3
such clip when it was taken from appellant. R-45. On examh1ation by the officer, the pistol was found not to have any shell
L1

the chamber and due to the absence of the clip it was incap·

ablo oI firing.

Testimony was taken regarding the ease with which the
clip could be released from the pistol. R-47. No testimony
is found in the record of anyone seeing the appellant release

tJ-ie clip, nor that the clip was ever in the pistol on the night
in question. R-55.

Further, there is no mention at all that

i

i a round was ever in the firing position.

On the day and night in question, appellant consumed
' br:;c amounts of alcohol at various taverns in Salt Lake County
L1 the company of William Sorensen. R-51-56. The appellant

, accompanied Mr. and Mrs. Sorenson from their home in Granger
!

Via other taverns to the Market Inn where they had a business

I ~ppointment.
I

.

R-71.

Mrs. Sorenson testified that appellant took the gun with
hrn when he left the car to enter the Market Lounge because

he wanted to sell it. She further testified that the appellant
did try to sell it to two other patrons of the Market Inn. R-72.

\Vi:ile Mr. and Mrs. Sorenson were conducting their business,

4

t.he appellant left the Market Inn. Mrs. Sorenson testified that
slie thought he was going to lie down in the car. R-73. He

apparently wandered some three doors up the street to Club
bl where the incident in question took place.
TI1e appellant testified that he had no recollection of leaving tl1e Market Inn and only remembers being taken to the hospital

La ,·e a head wound sown up, which he had sustained in the

to

scwfle. R-84.
I

i
I

1

At trial, the appellant was asked on direct examination
wh2tl:er he had an accident in 1957. R-78. An objection by

tiie prosecution to the materiality and closeness of relation
w:i0

sust'.J.iI1ed by the trial judge. Appellant's proffer of proof

indicated that the appellant was involved in an accident where
he fell down the stairs and suffered a severe concussion and
'1

clot on the brain. Further, that since the operation, the

appelbnt had exhibited abnormal reactions tn liquor, in that
he

suffered blackouts and irrational conduct. R-95.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN UNLOADED AU1DMA TIC PIS1DL IS NOT A
DEADLY WEAPON WITHIN TI-IE MEANING OF

5

OJ? SECTION 76-51-3 UTAH CODE Ai\JNOTATED,
1953, WHEN SUCH PISTOL COULD INFLICT HARM

O.NL Y IF A CLIP CONTAIN1NG LIVE AMMUNITION
IS INSERTED INTO A PISTOL AND A SHELL INJECTED
lN'lD 'TIIE FIRING CHAMBER BY WORKING IBE

SLIDE.
Tiie appellant submits that the trial court erred in re1

lucii.116 to give Defendant's Instruction r.;o. 4 which is a true

stJtc:ment of the law as it applies to this case. The court
; furL:1~r erred in giving Court's Instruction No. 13.

Defendant's requested instruction number 4 provides as
"You are instructed that before you can find the
defendant guilty of the crime of Assault with a Deadly
. veapon with the Intent to Commit Robbery, you must
find beyond a reasonable that defendant did in fact
use a deadly weapon.
You are further instructed that an unloaded gun
is not a deadly weapon. The State must provebepnd
a reasonable doubt that the gun held by Don Hansen
in this case was loaded at the time. If it is reasonable to believe that the gun was not loaded, you should
acquit the defendant."
The final paragraph of the Court's Instruction No. 13

6

"A deadly weapon, as that term is used in these
instructions, means a weapon which in the particular
manner used is then and there capable of producing
death or great bodily harm. A loaded gun capable of
being fired, or a gun capable of being fired and which
can then and there be immediately loaded within a
matter of moments is a deadly weapon."

~

The Defendant's Instruction No. 4 is a true statement of
tl1e ln.w and the Court's Instruction No. 13, which was given,
I

r

is not a lru2! statement; hence, it is misleading and prejudiced.

TI1e general rule is that an unloaded gun, used only as a
firearm and not as a bludgeon, is not a deadly weapon within
ti~c

contemplation of statutes punishing as aggravated assaults,

assaults witl1 a deadly weapon. People v. Sylva, 143 Cal.62,

76 Pac .814(1904); Price v. U. S., 156 Fed.950(1807); State v.

----- ---

r

I
•
)

I

~·

--- --

0odfrey, 170r. 300,llAm.St. Rep. 83,20Pac. 625(1889);

Territory v. Gomez, 14 Ariz. 139, 125 Pac. 102(1912); 74 ALR
1206 (Cases are collected and cited.)

1:1e traditional definition of assault with a deadly weapon
is ns follows:

"to constitute the crime of assault with a deadly
or dangerous weapon, there must be an unlawful attempt
with a deadly weapon, deadly or dangerous as a matter
of law, or capable of being used in a dangerous manner

7

to iru.1.ict bodily injury, coupled with the present
_actual ability to do so. (Emphasis added) I
Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 361
'
720 (Anderson ed. 1957)."
The California court has e.xtended the rule somewhat
,

l:.olJing that an automatic pistol which has six shells in the

;.;i

clip but none in the firing chamber and which was in firing
:

order, but which could be readied by pulling a slide back and
!

1llowing it to go forward again, constituted a deadly weapon
\dJ1in t.lie meaning of the Penal Code. People ~Pearson,
1)U C. A. 2d 811, 311 P. 2d 142(1957). In so holding the court
fou~1cl

tl1n.t t11e case fell wiu'1in the rule initially laid down in

fcople v. Simpson, 134 C. A. 646, 25 P. 2d 142(1933). Therethe court held that a rifle containing live rounds in the maga-

111

?iPc and none in the firing chamber, but such live rounds

co11ld be quickly injected into the chamber by merely cocking
::i

lever, was such a deadly weapon. The underlying rationale

is that such firearm should not be considered unloaded when
;t
i1y

"instantly" could be transferred into such a loaded weapon
mere operation of a lever. The court reasoned that to hold

cthcnvise would be to assert that a pistol with an automatic
l\!Yolving cylinder filled with loaded cartridges does not con 't· 1 lt!te
0 11

a deadly weapon although mere pressure of a finger

t;:c trigger releases a safety pin and adjusts a cartridge

8

i.n position to be discharged.

In the instant case, the pistol could not be transferred
"instantly" into a deadly weapon. A clip or magazine containrn2 live ammunition had to be manually inserted into the

llanJle of the weapon, the slide safety released, and the slide
• pulled back by holding the pistol in one hand and pulling with
the other, then releasing the slide which under power supplied
i by a spring inserts a shell into the firing chamber and cocks

tlic pistol.

It is submitted that the present case does not fit within
tLe ex ten tion of the general rule laid' down by the California

, courts. Rather because of the added functions to be performed
I

, v;ith tl1is weapon before the weapon would be capable of causing

harm or injury, this case must fall within the general rule
1

I

LhJ.t an unloaded firearm is not a deadly weapon within the
meaning of tl1e definition of fue crime of assault witl1 a deadly

, WcJpon. Further, a ruling that the weapon in this case was
: S\11:h

'~'f

a deadly weapon would be to ignore the tradition~! definition

t."ie crime, and in effect would be to rule fuat one may have

he present actual ability to inflict harm when the weapon with

1

' Which he was alleged to have committed an assault had to be
r

~ 1o'.ldcd before any harm could be done with it. This is contrary
I

9
r

to the plain meaning of the defini lion of the crime and con -

' rrar y to the general rule that an unloaded firearm is not a
deadly weapon.
It might be argued by the State that there is little dif-

ference between the instant case and those giving rise to the
, California decisions in that the operation to be performed
~

I

before t11e weapon could be operative could be performed in

) a relalively short period of time. Thus the court's instruction
I

! no. 13 saying that a weapon v1hich can be loaded within a

I

I' n11ttcr of moments is a deadly weapon would fall within the

!--------

California rule and would be a proper instruction. Yet,

hew long is a moment? It should be noted that the California
('n 1irt

held only that when an unloaded firearm could be in-

stantly transfonned into a loaded gun capable of doing great

bodily harm could it be considered a deadly weapon. Under
ll1e expanded rationale inherant in the court's instruction

almost any modern firearm could be considered a deadly
'VP;:ipon since almost any firearm can be loaded by manually

inserting a live cartridge into the firing chamber within a
1

-~natter of moments. Such a holding would completely oblite1 ate

the general rule that an unloaded firearm is not a

'

I
f
/

10
Jeadly weapon and would in effect do away with the requirement that there be the present actual ability to carry out the
tlircat as a requisite element of the crime charged.
POINT 11
TI-IE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TD
ALLOW TESTIMONY CONCERNING A PRIOR
ACCIDENT \VHICH CAUSED BRAIN DAMAGE
TO DEFENDANT.

TI1e Utah court has held as a general rule that evidence
f

of any fact which rationally tends to prove any material issue

! i:: .idmissible unless forbidden by some specific rule,

and it

~ :~Lo;;.lcl be received ii offered for an admissible purpose al-

' tho11Lh it would be inadmissible for some other purpose. State

I v.:._ Neal,

123 Utah 93, 254 P. 2d 1053(1953); State v. Nemier,

i06 Utah 307, 148 P. 2d 327(1944); State:!...:_ Scott, 111 Utah 9,
l/j

p. 2d 1016(1947).
All of t..he above cited cases resulted when the particular

rbfcndant challenged the admissibility of particular State's eviL1ence. TI1e above rule was used to justify admission of evidence
for the State. There seems to be no logical reason why the
r:~::-n.dant should not be allowed to envoke the same rule when

I

11

I

/ presenting evidence in his own behalf.
Ordinarily, intent is an essential element of a crime.
Fe0plc '!_· Miller, 4 Utah 412, 11 Pac. 514(1886); People ~

Swas3y, 6 Utah 93, 21 Pac. 400(1889); I Wharton's, Criminal
Law and Procedure § 60, 135 (Anderson ed. 1957). Dependin~

on the crime charged the accused must have at least

i.n~:r:dcd

to do the act which the legislature has deemed a

,·rltne.

The fact of intoxication does not in itself affect the
-a;iJcity of a person to commit a crime nor his legal res-

1

pon.sibility therefor. Hopt ~Utah, 104 U. S. 631; Hall,
bto::ica.tion and Criminal Responsibility, 57 Harv. L. Rev.
1015. However, when an element of the offense is a specific
m2ntal state, and the fact that the defendant was intnxicated

ae6:ites such a mental state, the defendant's intoxication is
::i

ri"fense. State v. Stenback

t

78 Utah 350, 2 P. 2d 1050,

') i\LR 878.
Utah has codified this rule in Section 76-1-22 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 which provides as follows:
Effect of intoxication. --No act committed by a person
\Vhile in a state of voluntary intoxication is less cri.mhal

12
by reason of his having been in such a condition.
But whenever the actual existance of any particular

purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element
to constitute any particular species or degree of
· crime, the jury may take into consideration the
fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time
in determining the purpose, motive or intent with
which he committed the act.

In the instant case, the appellant was charged with

assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to commit robbery contrary to Section 76-51-3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

TMs crime by its statutory terms requires that the accused
ll:lve the specific intent to commit robbery.

Thus, the crime

charged is within the preview of the quoted statute on the effect
0£ intoxication.

At trial the defendant was asked on direct examination
Whether he had an accident in 1957. The prosecutor objected
to the question on the grounds of materiality and closeness of

relation. The defendant's proffer of proof asserts that he fell

r0wn stairs in 1957 suffering a severe concusion and a clot on
the brain. Although an operation was performed to correct

the damage, the defendant has suffered reoccuring physical
problems including an abnormal reaction to liquor. This is

13

maaucsted by blackouts and irrational conduct. The trial
' Jud;;-e sustained the objection.

It is submitted that the instant case falls within the

general rule requiring that evidence be admitted if it rationally tends to prove any material issue.

The defendant testi-

fied at trial that he could not remember anything from the
tir11c he was in the Market Inn until he awoke in the police car

on the way to tl1e hospital. Any experienced trial judge can
recall time and time again, in the face of overwhelming evid~nce,

that the accused cannot remember what happened.

Normally the credence of such statements is rightly viewed
with skepticism.

This case, however, is not the normal

case. In this case, the defendant had suffered a physical
injury to his brain which affected his reaction to liquor in
: that he has a past history of blackouts and irrational con!

TI1is evidence lends credence to the defendant's testi-

duct.

rn011y relating to lack of memory.

Surely a defendant should not be forclosed from presenting evidence that will give credence to an otherwise incredulous claim because the trial judge is prone to disbelieve the
rL:tim.

This matter is properly a matter for the jury. The

14
trial judge asked during the defendant's proffer of proof what

sort of irrational things were claimed to have been done by
:tl1e defendant in the periods of blackout.

R-96. On reply

tliat he had gotten into fights, and further, that he had had

.prnJ1lems with his wife, namely, that he had struck her thus
!necessitating a divorce on her part, the court commented,

."I think half tl1e divorces I've heard involve that sort of con-

1
1

I

'

duct between husband and wife?" Such a comment indicates
tl1at the court may have been predisposed as to evidence re-

1

latin2' to t.he defendant's claim.

i

One stated ground for objection by the prosecutor is that

lthe l95 7 accident was

"not closely enough related." It has

reen held by most courts that an objection for remoteness

'goes to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evi1

-

fdence and the question of exclusion of the evidence for remote'

!ness is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial judge.

~Dt~_v~ _E•.rans, 88 Ariz. 364, 356 P. 2d ll06(1960); State~

lLnold, 45 Wash. 2d 505 , 275 P. 2d 895(1954); State ~Koch,
~-·-

,6J Wyo. 175, 189 P. 2d 162(1948); State~ Nelson, 362 P. 2d

f21(.1961). Although the particular.ca.se was a civil case for
~ssault and battery rather than cnmmal, the Utah court fol1

15
lowed the above stated rule in Evans v. Gainsford,
1[22 Utah 156, 24 7 P. 2d 431 (1952).

It is stated as a general rule in regard to exclusion

ifor remoteness,
"Remoteness is a matter of degree. Its
essence is such a want of open and visible connection between the evidentiary and principle
facts that, all things considered, the former
is not worthy or safe to be admitted in proof
of the latter ••• To be admissible, evidence
must not be so remote in time as to be immaterial." 22 C. J. S. § 638, 987.
In the instant case, the accident happened in 1957.
However, the defendant had suffered from the affects of the
accident up until the time of the alleged crime. One of such
affects was the abnormal reaction to the consumption of liquor.
1

i

Although evidence of intoxication was admitted, evidence of this

Idefendant's

abnormal reaction was not.

It has been argued that the proffered evidence is material
·and as such should have been admitted. Under the general rule

i that evidence is admissible which rationally tends to prove any
material issue, the evidence should have been admitted even
tt1ough it might have been inadmissible for another reason. Howl

lS
Jcr, Ll1e remoteness rule is expressed in terms of the lack
uf u-:..J.terialicy. An exclusion by tl1e trial jud.;e for n::rnote-

::.:'J is also a determination foat the evicience is imm.aterial,

1

i TL.'.1·e~(he,
I

I

'~
1
1
r
11 .. e c.;e1enc.ant
s acc1'd ent an d th e resultant physical
r

I

,:;;;~crs

1

we rnust examine this latter possiliili17.

! ::."l
1

I ,;,.;

on him when under the influence of alcohol are mat-

~~is

._,J

defense u::der

c1·._ c1--:2ut

~le crime

chJ.rf;ed even t::oll.;h

L;it:pencu in 195 7, some:: te11 yc;.ns earlier. Such

,_,;:.;:.;.,,·0 :_,ccs LO L:c l.:ick of specific int2nt. If the defendant

; :.. .._,_:..:j:s L:om auvcrsc effocts of 1..i1e 1957 accident, evi-~

c 1:;:::rcof s:10uld be admissible regardless of when the

'··-·:~ .. t

'

·~

cccurrcd. Since t:l1e eilects 0£ the injury tends to

'."Jrci:..:J.tivc on ti'1e issue of s ccific intent, evidence of the

I i:.~~·nt sl:ould have been admissible under the general rule
I

J.'

IrcqL'iring the admission of any fact that rationally tends to
\:~''"-'2 ~H'-Y

material issue. Tli.erefore, the sustaining of the

CO~CLUSION

'I~Je

Appellant has not been accorded a full and fair

ti I''., ;i.nd the issue raised on appeal afford a basis for re0

.~

failure of the trial judge to admit evidence favorable

17

to J.J C:clense and his refusal to instruct the jury as to the

ltrne J.ncl correct law prejudiced the case of the Appellant.

11112 \_;:;£e11dant is entitled to the relief sought on appeal.

I

I'

Respecifully submitted,
Galen Ross

:MITSUNAGA AND ROSS
731 Ea.st South Temple

Salt Lake City, Utah

